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Abstract
This article examines the recent decision in Michigan v. EPA, in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the EPA acted unreasonably in not considering costs at the listing phase of the
regulation of power plants’ emissions under a specific provision of the Clear Air Act (CAA). In
Michigan, the Court interpreted the applicable statutory provision based on the principles of ratio-
nal administrative decision-making, thereby establishing a connection between cost consideration
by administrative agencies and the principles of reasonable exercise of administrative discretion.
We contend that Michigan failed to properly appreciate the logical and axiological connection
between cost consideration and administrative rationality (i.e., the cost/rationality nexus). More
specifically, the Court failed to distinguish between two independent steps of cost consideration:
cost determination and cost quantification. Cost determination considers that one set of relevant
interests must be made a cost upon someone else, and decides how to allocate rights between
competing interests. This decision rests on political considerations and moral factors that are in-
dependent of the concept of cost. Cost quantification requires deliberating to what extent one set of
interests should be made a cost upon someone else. Unlike cost determination, cost quantification
is logically based on the concept of cost. Cost quantification assumes cost determination in order
to function. The failure to appreciate this distinction led to illogical reasoning by the Court and
to a decision that is inconsistent with Congress’ cost determination. This paper contributes to the
legal-economic literature on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) by outlining a functional dimension of
cost consideration by administrative agencies that is frequently overlooked in legal-economic liter-
ature. While CBA proponents often note that cost consideration provides agencies with a method
for promoting social welfare maximization, we emphasize that cost consideration enhances the
rationality of administrative action by ensuring a transparent and accountable definition of the set
of relevant interests that underpins the definition of costs and benefits.
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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the recent decision in Michigan v. EPA, in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the EPA acted unreasonably 
in not considering costs at the listing phase of the regulation of power 
plants’ emissions under a specific provision of the Clear Air Act 
(CAA). In Michigan, the Court interpreted the applicable statutory 
provision based on the principles of rational administrative decision-
making, thereby establishing a connection between cost consideration 
by administrative agencies and the principles of reasonable exercise of 
administrative discretion. We contend that Michigan failed to properly 
appreciate the logical and axiological connection between cost 
consideration and administrative rationality (i.e., the cost/rationality 
nexus). More specifically, the Court failed to distinguish between two 
independent steps of cost consideration: cost determination and cost 
quantification. Cost determination considers that one set of relevant 
interests must be made a cost upon someone else, and decides how to 
allocate rights between competing interests. This decision rests on 
political considerations and moral factors that are independent of the 
concept of cost. Cost quantification requires deliberating to what 
extent one set of interests should be made a cost upon someone else. 
Unlike cost determination, cost quantification is logically based on the 
concept of cost. Cost quantification assumes cost determination in 
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order to function. The failure to appreciate this distinction led to 
illogical reasoning by the Court and to a decision that is inconsistent 
with Congress’ cost determination. This paper contributes to the legal-
economic literature on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) by outlining a 
functional dimension of cost consideration by administrative agencies 
that is frequently overlooked in legal-economic literature. While CBA 
proponents often note that cost consideration provides agencies with a 
method for promoting social welfare maximization, we emphasize that 
cost consideration enhances the rationality of administrative action by 
ensuring a transparent and accountable definition of the set of relevant 
interests that underpins the definition of costs and benefits. 
 
Cost and therefore economizing is not a natural 
phenomenon of the production function but, rather, an 
institutional artifact.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Michigan v. EPA,2 the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) acted unreasonably 
when it refused to consider costs in deciding whether it was 
“appropriate and necessary” to regulate mercury emissions from 
power plants under the Clean Air Act (CAA).3 The decision is 
significant for two reasons. First, the Court established that an agency 
that ignores costs acts arbitrarily, thus giving costs a more central role 
                                                                 
 1. A. Allen Schmid, All Environmental Policy Instruments Require a Moral 
Choice as to Whose Interests Count, in ECONOMICS, ETHICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY: CONTESTED CHOICES 133, 135 (Daniel W. Bromley & Jouni Paavola eds., 
2002). 
 2. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 3. Id. at 2712. The CAA established a comprehensive set of regulatory programs 
to control air pollution, including the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants (NESHAP). 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d). Coal- and oil-fired electric utility 
steam generating units (i.e., power plants) fall within NESHAP’s scope. § 
7412(n)(1). 
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in judicial review of rational administrative action. Second, the Court 
created a new default cost-benefit rule that applies when statutes are 
silent or ambiguous—i.e., in the absence of an unambiguous statutory 
prohibition to consider cost, courts must still assume that an agency 
that ignores costs is acting arbitrarily. In taking these steps, the Court 
expressly uses the concept of cost to articulate a canon of 
administrative rationality.4 Cost consideration is an essential 
component of “logical and rational” agency decision making.5 
Agencies should take this principle account when interpreting 
statutory provisions. However, Michigan leaves unanswered questions 
concerning the relationship between cost and rationality. Therefore, it 
is no surprise that the true impact of Michigan on the practice of cost 
consideration remains the subject of considerable debate among legal 
scholars and practitioners.6 
                                                                 
 4. In this article, we use rationality to refer to non-arbitrary/non-capricious 
administrative behavior in the context of administrative law. The requirement of 
rationality is rooted in section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
which established that Courts must hold unlawful and set aside agency actions found 
to be “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or “otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A). We use the terms arbitrary and capricious standard of review and hard 
look review interchangeably. For additional discussion regarding the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review, see Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-
Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177 (1983); Lisa S. Bressman, Judicial Review 
of Agency Discretion, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
AGENCIES 177 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. L. REV. 
67 (2009); and Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 
92 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2014). 
 5. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706. 
 6. See, e.g., Andrew M. Grossman, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandate for Agencies 
to Consider Costs, 2015 CATO SUPR. CT. REV. 281 (2014); Lindsay Ward, Michigan 
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 6 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1 (2015), 
http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss6/12/; Ruby Khallouf, Michigan v. EPA: 
Money Matters When Deciding Whether to Regulate Power Plants, 27 VILL. ENVTL. 
L. J. 275 (2016); Jonathan Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the 
Judicial Role, 787 COASE-SANDOR WORKING PAPER SERIES IN L. AND ECON. (2016); 
Lauren Packard, Note, Michigan: An Intrusive Inquiry into EPA’s Rulemaking 
Process, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117 (2016); Connor Schratz, Note, Michigan v. 
EPA and the Erosion of Chevron Deference, 68 ME. L. REV. 381 (2016); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1 (2017); Adrian Vermeule, Does Michigan v. EPA Require Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 
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In this article, we examine the Supreme Court’s reasoning with 
respect to the cost/rationality nexus. We do not provide a 
comprehensive discussion of all the points related to the statutory 
interpretative issues that were relevant in Michigan.7 We contend that 
Michigan failed to properly appreciate the logical and axiological 
connection between cost consideration and administrative rationality 
(i.e., the cost/rationality nexus). More specifically, the Court failed to 
distinguish between two logically independent steps of cost 
consideration: cost determination and cost quantification.8 Cost 
determination considers that one set of relevant interests must be made 
a cost upon a competing set of interests, and decides how to allocate 
rights between competing interests. Cost quantification requires 
deliberating to what extent one set of interests should be made a cost 
upon someone else. The phrase refers to cost-benefit balancing. It is 
not limited to monetized cost-benefit analysis (CBA), but includes a 
wide array of procedures and practices used by agencies to balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of agency decisions. This broader 
meaning allows us to focus on the functional dimension common to all 
cost-benefit balancing techniques, which is assessing the degree of 
sacrifice imposed on a given set of relevant interests relative to the 
corresponding benefits accorded to another set of interests. 
The lack of distinction between cost determination and cost 
quantification led to illogical reasoning by the Court. Based on the 
ruling in Michigan, it is evident that the cost/rationality nexus needs to 
be re-examined; the rationality of administrative action will only be 
                                                                 
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 6, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/does-
michigan-v-epa-require-cost-benefit-analysis-by-adrian-vermeule/. 
 7. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see, for instance, supra note 3, and 
references thereafter. See also Grossman, supra note 6; Ward, supra note 6; Packard, 
supra note 6. 
 8. This theory builds on Nussbaum’s assertion: “[W]e may note that cost-benefit 
analysis can actually help us when we are in doubt about where to set the threshold 
of citizens’ basic entitlements. In environmental and regulatory areas, for example, 
seeing the cost of various levels of protection is helpful when we consider exactly 
what level of protection is a basic entitlement . . . . More generally, all rights have 
costs, so thinking about where to set the threshold level of any right is sensibly done 
with these costs in mind.” Martha Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral 
Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1035 (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
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improved once the distinction between cost quantification and cost 
determination is fully appreciated. Without a clear definition of the 
cost/rationality nexus, in light of the distinction between cost 
determination and cost quantification, Michigan will likely introduce 
more confusion to the regulatory process. 
This paper contributes to the legal-economic literature on CBA by 
focusing on a dimension of cost consideration by administrative 
agencies that is often overlooked in legal-economic discourse. CBA 
proponents often note that cost consideration provides agencies with a 
method for promoting social welfare maximization. However, there is 
a functional element of cost consideration that is distinct from, and 
logically precedes, the maximization of social welfare: the definition 
of the set of relevant interests. Cost consideration enhances the 
rationality of administrative action by first ensuring a transparent and 
accountable delineation of the set of relevant interests that underpins 
the definition of costs and benefits. When an agency clearly identifies 
whose interests are made a cost to whom, its regulatory actions are 
considered transparent and accountable. When it is not clear “whose 
interests count,” cost consideration has little influence on 
administrative rationality. When careful attention is paid to the two 
functional aspects of cost consideration, cost determination and cost 
quantification, the consistency and transparency of regulatory action 
can be improved. 
By building on observations derived from three separate strands of 
scholarship, we seek to explain the cost/rationality nexus. First, 
concepts developed by law and economics scholars are used to identify 
the institutional nature of costs, noting that the interests of some are 
made costs to others through the assignment of legal rights.9 Cost is a 
function of assigning rights; rights are not derived from costs. Second, 
we build on economic literature that has critically examined the issue 
                                                                 
 9. See A. Allan Schmid, Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective, in 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 57 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989); WARREN J. SAMUELS, 
STEVEN J. MEDEMA & A. ALLAN SCHMID, THE ECONOMY AS A PROCESS OF 
VALUATION (1997); STEVEN G. MEDEMA, NICHOLAS MERCURO & WARREN J. 
SAMUELS, Institutional Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 418 
(Gerrit de Gees ed., 2000). 
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of ‘standing’ in cost-benefit analysis.10 This literature has long 
recognized that value assumptions underlie the decisions made 
regarding whose preferences have standing. Welfare maximization can 
be achieved through CBA only because judgments regarding whose 
welfare should be factored into the social welfare calculus have been 
made. For this reason, the issue of standing cannot be resolved on 
technical grounds, but depends on value choices and ethical 
considerations. Third, we draw on recent administrative law 
scholarship that has emphasized the multifaceted nature of the 
arbitrary review process11 and has recognized the role of political 
considerations in hard look review.12 Arguably, these insights enable 
courts to identify more targeted and specific forms of arbitrariness in 
light of the proposed distinction between cost determination and cost 
quantification, thereby better serving as juridical safeguards against 
unrestrained agency behavior. 
Taken together, these three strands of scholarship enable us to 
illuminate the content of the cost/rationality nexus, to recognize the 
logical relevance and juridical nature of the assumptions underpinning 
cost consideration, and to deem an administrative action arbitrary if it 
fails to comport with the set of statutorily defined relevant interests. 
Ultimately, these insights provide a conceptual framework for 
enhancing the transparency and consistency of legal-economic 
reasoning in the context of regulatory action, based on the assumption 
                                                                 
 10. See Ezra J. Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. 
PAPERS 255 (1967); William M. Trumbull, Who Has Standing in Cost Benefit 
Analysis?, 9 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 201 (1990); Richard O. Zerbe Jr., 
Comment: Does Benefit Cost Analysis Stand Alone? Rights and Standing, 10 J. OF 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 96 (1991); Richard O. Zerbe Jr., The Legal Foundation 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 93 (2007). 
 11. See Virelli, supra note 4. 
 12. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1992); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); T. J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of 
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008); Kathryn Watts, Proposing a 
Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2 (2009); Nina 
A. Mendelson, Disclosing ‘Political’ Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010). 
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that the legislative branch remains the actor whose will and legitimacy 
should be considered in the political definition of the relevant interests. 
This article is organized in four sections. Section 2 briefly examines 
the Michigan decision by highlighting its two major contributions to 
the practice of cost consideration: the cost/rationality nexus and the 
new default cost-benefit rule. Section 3 develops a conceptual analysis 
of the cost/rationality nexus. It examines the logical features of the 
concept of cost, and articulates the distinction between cost 
determination and cost quantification. Section 4 applies the proposed 
conceptual framework to the central issue in Michigan. It shows that 
the proposed institutional understanding of the cost/rationality 
nexus—centered on the definition of the set of relevant interests and 
the distinction between cost determination and cost quantification—
provides an alternative understanding of the relevant issue in Michigan 
and identifies the inconclusiveness of arguments used by the Supreme 
Court. 
I. MICHIGAN’S IMPACT ON COST CONSIDERATION 
The central issue in Michigan is whether the EPA unreasonably 
refused to consider costs at the listing phase, when determining 
whether the regulation of mercury emissions from power plants was 
“appropriate and necessary” under §7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA.13 The 
EPA interpreted this statutory provision as not demanding cost 
considerations in listing decisions, and so made the initial decision 
accordingly, reserving the consideration of the cost of regulation until 
                                                                 
 13. The CAA created a multi-stage regulatory process that the EPA must follow. 
In the listing phase, the EPA determines whether the sources of air pollutants present 
a threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment, thus warranting 
regulation: 
“The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public health 
reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric utility 
steam generating units of pollutants listed under subsection (b) after 
imposition of the requirements of this Act . . . . The Administrator shall 
regulate electric utility steam generating units under this section, if the 
Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after 
considering the results of the study required by this subparagraph.” 
42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). At the standard-setting phase, the agency sets emission 
standards that major sources must meet to achieve emission reductions. 
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after it had determined the standards’ stringency.14 Petitioners 
requested review of the EPA’s new rule, arguing that the proper scope 
of “appropriate” would encompass consideration by the EPA of all 
“relevant factors, including costs.”15 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia ruled for the EPA, holding that it was reasonable 
for the agency to not consider costs at the listing phase and stating that 
section 7412(n)(1)(A) neither requires nor prohibits the EPA from 
considering costs.16 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the 
“EPA interpreted §7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably when it deemed cost 
irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants.”17 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, bluntly stated, “[I]t is unreasonable to read an 
instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether 
regulation is appropriate and necessary as an invitation to ignore cost.” 
18 
Michigan’s contribution to the practice of cost consideration is 
twofold: 1) it established a connection between cost consideration and 
administrative rationality, thereby giving a primary role to cost in the 
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review; and 2) 
it articulated a new default rule for interpreting statutes that are silent 
or ambiguous. 
                                                                 
 14. Pursuant to § 7412(n)(1)(A), power plants are listed as source categories 
based on the results of EPA’s assessment of the hazards to public health that are 
reasonably anticipated to occur after other CAA requirements are imposed on power 
plants. The provision does not further specify what factors are relevant in the listing 
phase, nor does it mention cost consideration. At the subsequent standard-setting 
phase, the EPA makes the threshold determination of emissions limits based on the 
following criteria: 1) the maximum achievable degree of reduction in emissions of 
pollutants; 2) the cost of achieving such emissions reduction; 3) any non-air quality 
health and environmental impacts, and 4) energy requirements. It should be noted 
that the statute explicitly mentions cost as a factor in the standard-setting phase, in 
contrast with the regulation of the listing phase. 
 15. Reply Brief of Petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group, et al. at 9-12, 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49), 2015 WL 
1247184. 
 16. White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
 17. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712. 
 18. Id. at 2708. 
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A. The Arbitrariness of Cost-Blindness 
In Michigan, the Supreme Court articulated a connection between 
cost consideration and the rationality of an agency’s administrative 
action. Consideration of cost is no longer just a feature of reasonable 
statutory interpretation; it is now an indispensable trait of rational 
administrative action.19 From this perspective, the (indeterminate) 
statutory expression “appropriate and necessary” must be read in light 
of the established administrative rule of law, according to which an 
agency rule is considered “arbitrary and capricious” if the agency 
relies on factors that Congress had not intended it to consider, or if it 
fails to consider an important aspect of the problem. 20 Based on this 
premise, an agency’s failure to engage with costs must be regarded by 
courts as an arbitrary action; this behavior can be referred to as cost-
blindness. 
In this manner, Michigan shifted the source of an agency’s duty to 
consider costs (in the case of an ambiguous or silent statute) from 
statutory authority to the principles of reasoned administrative 
decision-making. Before Michigan, the Supreme Court approached the 
issue of cost consideration as one concerning the scope of an agency’s 
statutory authority. Using what is known as the Chevron two-step test, 
the Court would apply traditional tools of statutory interpretation to 
determine whether Congress had spoken directly to the question at 
issue.21 If the Court determined that the statute was silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue under agency consideration, it asked 
whether the agency’s construction of the statute was a reasonable one 
and, as such, warranted Chevron deference (i.e., the Court defers to the 
agency’s reasonable interpretation). 
In Michigan, the Court acknowledged that the statute was 
ambiguous about the requirement of cost consideration, thereby 
satisfying step one of the test. It then articulated an innovative 
interpretation of the second step of the Chevron test, based on the 
                                                                 
 19. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 282; Masur & Posner, supra note 6, at 35; 
Packard, supra note 6, at 118; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 16. 
 20. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 21. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U. S. 837, 843 (1984). 
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rationality doctrine: when determining permissible statutory 
interpretation, courts should regard cost considerations as required 
under any statutory framework that does not expressly preclude them. 
In this way, the area of permissible statutory interpretation overlaps 
with the area of reasonable exercise of administrative discretion. As 
Grossman noted, in Michigan the “Chevron step-two reasonableness 
analysis parallels arbitrary-and-capricious review.”22 Under this legal 
framework, the majority found that the EPA went far beyond the 
bounds of reasonable action when it read section 7412(n)(1) to mean 
it could ignore costs when making a listing decision.23 
B. The Default Cost-Benefit Rule in Michigan 
Michigan alters the structure of the default cost-benefit rule that 
operates when the relevant statute is silent or ambiguous. Before 
Michigan, the Supreme Court had interpreted silent or ambiguous 
statutory provisions as reflecting congressional intent to defer to 
agencies as to whether and how they would engage in cost-benefits 
analysis.24 Michigan flips the default position from one that permits to 
                                                                 
 22. Grossman, supra note 6, at 294. See also Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake 
of Chevron’s Retreat, GEORGE MASON CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE REVISITING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE CONFERENCE (1995), 
https://sls.gmu.edu/csas/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2016/06/Sharkey_In-the-
Wake-of-Chevron_5_20_16.pdf. 
 23. Justice Scalia wrote, “Chevron allows agencies to choose among competing 
reasonable interpretations of a statute; it does not license interpretive gerrymanders 
under which an agency keeps parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away 
parts it does not.” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708. 
 24. In American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, the Supreme Court held that 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration was not required to engage in 
cost-benefit analysis when setting “feasible” public health and safety standards. 452 
U.S. 490, 510-12 (1981). In the absence of express statutory authorization, the Court 
suggested a presumption against the use of CBA. In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 
Inc., the Court found that the fact that the statute did not expressly authorize CBA 
could not be interpreted as limiting the agency’s discretion. 556 U.S. 208, 222-23 
(2009). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated, “It is eminently reasonable to 
conclude that [statutory] silence is meant to convey nothing more than a refusal to 
tie the agency’s hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so 
to what degree.” Id. 
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one that mandates consideration of costs.25 By enlarging the word 
“appropriate” to require that the EPA consider cost, the Supreme Court 
established a strong legal presumption that all agencies are obligated 
to give adequate consideration to cost in the absence of an express 
statutory provision to the contrary. In light of this principle, the EPA’s 
refusal to consider costs could only be deemed reasonable if Congress 
itself expressly precluded cost consideration, or if costs were not a 
relevant factor of the issue under the agency’s review. By altering the 
default cost-benefit rule, Michigan incrementally shifted the allocation 
of law-making powers from agencies to courts. 
Two points must be emphasized. First, the Court was unanimous in 
finding that the EPA is required to consider costs and that this 
obligation stems from both the statutory scheme and background 
principles of administrative law.26 However, the Justices disagree on 
when in the regulatory process cost considerations should be taken into 
account.27 Second, Michigan leaves unanswered a number of 
fundamental questions concerning the content of cost consideration; in 
particular, why cost consideration must be a requisite of administrative 
rationality. This question must be addressed in order to specify the 
prescriptive meaning of the Michigan principle that an agency that 
ignores costs acts arbitrarily. That is the analytical direction in which 
this article is now headed. 
                                                                 
 25. Michigan contrasts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In Whitman, the Court 
reasoned that ambiguity in the language of the enabling statute forbid regulation 
based on consideration of costs. Id. at 467. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
asserted that agencies could consider costs only if Congress had clearly authorized 
them to do so. Id. The Court ruled unanimously that Section 109 of the CAA 
precluded consideration of implementation costs in setting air quality standards. Id. 
at 477-86. In Michigan, Justice Scalia stated that Whitman was not applicable, 
because the “appropriate and necessary” standard is more comprehensive than the 
“protection of public health” standard used in Whitman. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 
2709. 
 26. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08. 
 27. Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion argues that cost should be considered at 
the standard-setting phase, not the listing phase, and emphasizes the central 
relevance of cost to reasoned administrative action: See id. at 2714-17 (Kagan, J. 
dissenting). 
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II. COST CONSIDERATION AS A RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT 
In Michigan, the need for cost consideration is based upon the 
normative principle that a rational administrative action is one that 
produces more good than harm.28 This principle compels an agency to 
explain why a proposed regulation will be beneficial. However, the 
logical and axiological connection between cost and rationality 
remains unclear. The Court does not provide an articulated explanation 
of the reasons why producing more good than harm should be regarded 
as a feature of administrative rationality, nor does it mention how cost 
consideration can help determine whether a regulation produces more 
good than harm. As a result, the Michigan principle that rationality 
requires cost consideration fails to provide a clear prescriptive 
meaning. 
In order to establish that rationality requires cost consideration, the 
Court must explain why producing more good than harm is a requisite 
of rationality and specify what good and what harm matter to whom. 
“Good” and “harm” are meaningful concepts only to the extent that 
they are selective normative judgments on whose interests count. 
Therefore, to conclude that a regulation must produce more good than 
harm one must first identify whose interest must be a cost to whom. 
Only by doing so will the normative baseline to assess whether good 
exceeds harm become available. In addition, the Court should have 
outlined the procedural requirements that are determinative in 
conferring rationality on the administrative action and how cost 
consideration as a decision procedure meets these requirements. This 
step is essential to defining the requirements of rational, non-arbitrary 
administrative decision-making. These three logical steps are needed 
to establish a connection between cost consideration and the rationality 
of administrative action, thereby determining the prescriptive meaning 
of the Michigan principle. Table 1 summarizes the discussion. 
 
                                                                 
 28. See id. at 2707 (“No regulation is appropriate if it does significantly more 
harm than good.”). 
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Table 1. Deconstructing the cost-rationality nexus 
Step 1 Based on what notion of rationality is regulation required to 
produce more good than harm? 
Step 2 What is the set of relevant interests that matters in defining 
what good and harm matter to whom? 
Step 3 What are the procedural requirements that confer rationality 
on administrative action and determine whether cost 
consideration meets these requirements? 
 
A. Rationality and Social Welfare Maximization 
Proponents of CBA hold the assumption that rational administrative 
agencies should work to increase social welfare.29 In this view, 
administrative rationality largely overlaps with economic rationality 
and, in particular, with the notion of social welfare maximization. In 
its most recent and accurate formulation, this account of rationality 
carefully distinguishes a moral criterion from a decision procedure.30 
The moral criterion defines the features of the morally desirable 
outcomes. The decision procedure is the technique for making choices 
that reach these desirable outcomes. From this analytical standpoint, a 
rational administrative action is grounded on weak welfarism as a 
moral criterion, and on CBA as a decision procedure.31 Weak 
welfarism aggregates individual preferences that are self-interested 
and survive idealization, producing morally desirable outcomes that 
maximize overall well-being.32 CBA and other procedures for 
considering costs provide agencies a means by which to measure the 
effects of proposed regulatory actions on an affected population.33 
We do not dispute the merit of weak welfarism as a moral criterion. 
We fundamentally agree, from a philosophical standpoint, that 
                                                                 
 29. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, 
RETAKING RATIONALITY (2008). 
 30. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 29, at 62. 
 31. See id. at 25-100. 
 32. Id. at 124–153. 
 33. Id. at 73–100. 
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administrative action should serve to enhance overall well-being.34 
Instead, we comment on the second assumption, that cost 
consideration must be regarded as a constitutive element of 
administrative rationality because it provides a method for 
determining whether regulations increase social welfare.35 While this 
account of the cost/rationality nexus captures one important functional 
dimension of cost consideration in the regulatory context, it tends to 
overlook the normative nature of the concept of cost. This involves the 
risk of potentially misguided applications of both cost consideration 
by agencies and arbitrary and capricious review by courts. 
The cost/rationality nexus, as we have outlined above, comprises 
three definitional steps: rationality, interests, and procedure. When 
cost consideration is explained exclusively in terms of social welfare 
maximization, a jump is made from step one (i.e., rationality as social 
welfare maximization) to step three (i.e., rational administrative action 
should rest on cost-benefit balancing), while step two (i.e., what costs 
and benefits to whom) is overlooked.36 To better illuminate the 
cost/rationality nexus, step two must be integrated into the more 
conventional account of the cost/rationality nexus. That is, we need to 
examine the normative dimension of the concept of cost and its 
institutional implications. 
                                                                 
 34. A discussion of the complex methodological issues associated with both the 
definition and measurement of social welfare construct is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For a comprehensive discussion, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & MARC 
FLEURBAEY, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (2016). 
 35. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 29 at 26, 62-63; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 
9-10. 
 36. One could argue that proponents of weak welfarism address step two by using 
restrictive criteria in the set of relevant preferences. However, it is one thing to refine 
preferences by excluding non-ideal or disinterest preferences, and another to delimit 
the welfare space by way of political choices as to whose interests count. The former 
focuses on the quality of the formation process of preferences and therefore pertains 
to the qualitative definition of the social welfare construct (step one). The second is 
a function of a political choice of whose interests count (step two). 
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B. What Costs and Benefits to Whom? 
1. Cost is a Relational Concept 
Cost is a metric used to measure the impact of procuring, producing, 
or acquiring a benefit or utility on a set of relevant interests—interests 
that are registered and valorized as a “cost” to be imposed on 
someone.37 In addition, cost often emerges in the context of 
structurally reciprocal relationships, where benefits to someone cannot 
be considered independently of the cost to someone else.38 The 
reciprocal nature of costs implies that the decision over whose interests 
are registered and valorized as costs to others is necessarily a function 
of the process of choosing. The cost is the result of a choice as to who 
will have the right to impose his or her own interests as costs to others 
and who will be exposed to the exercise of those rights. 
The concept of opportunity costs helps to explain these features. 
Cost is opportunity set specific – that is, the cost of a choice or line of 
conduct is a function of a set of available opportunities.39 Individuals’ 
opportunity sets are fundamentally shaped by conflicts between 
competing interests. Given the existence of constraints on the 
satisfaction of all interests present in society, the fulfillment of 
someone’s interests often limits the opportunity set of someone else’s 
interest.40 Hence, it is often the case that one element x of A’s 
opportunity set produces an adverse impact upon B’s opportunity set. 
That is, x represents the interests of A for which B must pay. In short, 
interest scarcity determines the structure of individuals’ opportunity 
sets.41 
This is an important methodological point: determining a cost 
requires identifying those individuals whose interests are to become a 
cost to someone else.42 This, in turn, suggests that cost is a relational 
concept. Cost is not a function of any intrinsic substance and does not 
have an independent ontological status. What is regarded as either cost 
                                                                 
 37. MEDEMA ET AL., supra note 9, at 213-14. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 233. 
 40. Id. at 228 
 41. Id. at 229. 
 42. Id. at 228-229. 
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or benefit is determined by implicit normative assumptions on whose 
interest should be made a cost to whom.43 Rather than being a merely 
technical assessment, the determination of cost is a positional exercise. 
Cost is interest-specific. 
This relational nature often leads to a serious problem of logical 
circularity, which arises when normative specifications underlying 
cost consideration are not clearly articulated. When logical circularity 
occurs, as Samuels observes, “the analyst assumes something about 
the object to be determined that governs the determination.”44 Applied 
to cost consideration, logical circularity occurs when costs are used to 
specify rights and rights are used to specify costs. In this way, logical 
circularity deprives cost consideration of any meaningful content.45 
To make normative premises as explicit as possible and to avoid 
logical circularity, any consideration of costs should define in advance 
the set of relevant interests. Applied to legal discourse, this principle 
entails that an obligation to consider costs is deprived of meaningful 
prescriptive content unless it is preceded by a clear specification of the 
antecedent normative premises of whose interests and what interests 
count.46 
2. Cost is Right-Specific 
Once the normative nature of cost has been clarified, the next step is 
to determine whether and to what extent the normative premises 
underpinning the language of cost are internal to legal-economic 
discourse. The structure of legal entitlements shapes the individual’s 
opportunity set that, in turn, determines the costs structure. More 
specifically, the law regulates the normative premises governing the 
selection of both 1) interests to be registered and valorized as costs to 
others, and 2) interests upon whom these costs should be imposed. The 
                                                                 
 43. Id. at 231. 
 44. Warren J. Samuels, Normative Premises in Regulatory Theory, 1 J. POST 
KEYNESIAN ECON. 100, 100 (1978). 
 45. See A. Allen Schmid, All Environmental Policy Instruments Require a Moral 
Choice as to Whose Interests Count, in ECONOMICS, ETHICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY: CONTESTED CHOICES 133, 135 (Daniel W. Bromley & Jouni Paavola eds., 
2002). 
 46. Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar, & David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOV. 48, 56 (2009). 
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interests of some are made a cost to others through the definition, 
allocation, and enforcement of legal entitlements.47 In addition, 
changes in the allocation of legal rights determine changes in the 
structure and allocation of costs. In essence, cost is right-specific,48 
meaning the language of cost cannot be used to specify rights. 
C. The Contribution of Cost Consideration to Administrative 
Rationality 
1. Cost as a “Relevant” Factor 
Cost consideration is a necessary requirement of administrative 
rationality to the extent that cost is to be regarded as a “relevant factor” 
in light of the statute.49 In fact, cost is almost always a relevant factor 
in regulation. It must be recognized, however, that the right- and 
interest-specific nature of cost affects the content of relevant factor 
analysis. Due to its intrinsic normative nature, costs are made relevant 
to the administrative action through a two-step process. First, as stated 
previously, cost is registered and valorized as such by legally defining 
the set of relevant interests. Statutes determine whose interests count 
and whose interests should be made a cost to whom. Then, once the 
set of relevant interests is defined, cost is made relevant to a specific 
administrative matter as one of the factors to be considered in 
articulating a satisfactory explanation for the administrative conduct. 
Understanding this twofold process of cost “juridicization” is key to 
truly comprehending the cost/rationality nexus and to identifying the 
proper degree of judicial deference toward agency cost consideration. 
                                                                 
 47. MEDEMA ET AL., supra note 9. 
 48. Id. 
 49. To satisfy the requirements imposed by the APA’s ban on arbitrariness, the 
administration must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.” Motor 
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983). In reviewing that explanation, courts must consider whether “the agency 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider” or entirely failed 
to consider an aspect of the problem deemed important in light of the statutory 
framework. Id. 
142 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
2. Cost Determination Versus Cost Quantification 
We identify two logically independent steps of cost consideration: 
cost determination and cost quantification. They correspond to step 
two and step three previously identified in Table 1. Cost determination 
involves a decision on how to allocate legal rights between competing 
interests, recognizing that a set of relevant interests must be made a 
cost upon the interests of another. This decision rests on political 
considerations and moral factors that are independent of the concept 
of cost. Because cost is the outcome of cost determination, cost 
determination cannot be based on any consideration of costs. The 
recognition that cost determination precedes cost quantification, and 
that it is legal in nature, indicates that the structure of legal rights is an 
institutional determinant of the structure of cost. Cost is first 
determined through the allocation of legal rights by evaluating a series 
of political and moral factors pertaining to the choice of whose 
interests count, and then it is quantified using weights and ranks. 
Cost quantification, meanwhile, determines how much one set of 
interests is made a cost to someone else’s interest. That is, it measures 
the degree of burden imposed on one set of interests for the satisfaction 
or protection of another set of competing interest. Cost quantification 
assumes cost determination in order to function. Unlike cost 
determination, cost quantification is logically based on the concept of 
cost. 
3. Deconstructing the Rationality Review of Cost Consideration 
The distinction between cost determination and cost quantification 
explains the twofold contribution that cost consideration provides to 
administrative rationality. First, cost consideration improves the 
rationality of administrative action by illuminating whose interests 
count, and whose interests are made a cost to whom. Second, by 
providing a methodology for determining whether the effects of a 
proposed administrative action increase social welfare, cost 
consideration is able to enhance administrative rationality. 
These considerations suggest that administrative rationality is 
reflective of the twofold process of cost juridicization. A strong legal 
trajectory in favor of CBA recognizes that rational administrative 
action must rely on an adequate explanation of cost-benefit balancing. 
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It is arbitrary and capricious to promulgate a regulation without 
comparing the magnitudes of costs and benefits (i.e., cost-blindness).50 
Absent statutory provision, any decision to not quantify costs and 
benefits, or to show that benefits justify the costs, requires the agency 
to provide a reasoned explanation justifying cost-blindness.51 
However, an administrative action can be deemed arbitrary for reasons 
beyond simply failing to perform cost quantification.52 A reasonable 
administrative action must be based on a transparent, accountable 
definition of the set of affected relevant interests. Therefore, a charge 
of arbitrariness might be leveled against an agency that acts 
inconsistently with the definition of the set of interests provided by 
statute; this behavior can be referred to as cost inconsistency. A 
regulation is cost-inconsistent when it is based on a language of costs 
and benefits that is not consistent with the set of interests set forth in, 
or taken as inference from, the statutory framework. In brief, the 
distinction between cost determination and cost quantification brings 
to light a further distinction between cost-inconsistency and cost-
blindness. 
This distinction unveils two targeted inquiries of the arbitrariness 
review of agency cost consideration. One objective of arbitrariness 
review is to assess the consistency of regulatory action with the cost 
determination established by statute. Courts ask whether the 
administrative conduct is consistent with the definition of the set of 
relevant interests—and therefore relevant benefits and costs—
provided by the applicable statute. While the arbitrariness assessment 
of an agency’s cost determination focuses on the definition of the set 
of interests affected by the administrative action, the arbitrariness 
assessment of cost quantification, the second objective of arbitrariness 
review, is centered on measuring the consequences of administrative 
conduct on these interests (see Table 2). Cost quantification improves 
administrative rationality by providing a method for measuring the 
benefits and costs of a proposed regulatory action,53 and it properly 
pertains to the institutional scope of the administrative process. Hence, 
                                                                 
 50. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 9. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. On the relationship between CBA and arbitrariness review, see Masur & 
Posner, supra note 6; Sunstein, supra note 6. 
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the arbitrariness review focuses on the adequacy of the agency’s 
consideration of the consequences of its action on the set of relevant 
interests. To make this determination, courts ask whether the agency 
has specified and measured the relevant benefits and costs, whether it 
has determined that the anticipated benefits are higher than costs, and 
whether it has provided a reasoned explanation if not. 
Table 2. Rationality Review and the Twofold Process of Cost 
Consideration 
 Rationality Review 
Cost Determination Courts should review whether the agency’s 
decision actually relies on, and is consistent 
with, the statutory definition of the set of 
relevant interests. 
Cost Quantification Courts should review the adequacy of the 
agency’s consideration of the consequences 
of administrative action on the set of 
relevant interests.54  
 
D. Rationality Review and Statutory Indeterminacy 
Any account of the cost/rationality nexus must be qualified in light 
of the allocation of decision-making powers that pertain to cost 
consideration across legal institutions. This section identifies the 
degree of statutory determinacy as the major determinant of the 
institutional allocation of decision-making powers. We argue that 
arbitrariness review should reflect the varying degrees of statutory 
determinacy. 
Four general directives derive from the structure of the 
constitutional-administrative system. First, Congress has the exclusive 
constitutional authority to define the set of relevant interests 
underlying cost determination. Second, Congress has the exclusive 
                                                                 
 54. As we will clarify later, “adequacy” is intended both as compliance with the 
cost-benefit balancing treatment provided by statute and, after Michigan, consistency 
with the principles of reasoned decision-making. 
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authority to mandate agencies to consider costs.55 Third, an agency 
rule is deemed arbitrary and capricious if it relies on factors that 
Congress has not intended it to consider.56 Fourth, courts strike down 
agency actions that fail to consider factors that are relevant by statute.57 
Within the framework defined by these general principles, cost 
determination is primarily performed thorough the political-legislative 
process, while cost quantification is performed by agencies and 
reviewed by courts in the case of judicial dispute. 
Based on this institutional framework, which grants priority to 
statutes over alternative sources of law with respect to cost 
determination, the allocation of choices involved in the process of cost 
consideration is largely a function of 1) the statutory definition of the 
set of relevant interests, and 2) the statutory provisions empowering 
agencies to use cost consideration. Institutional issues arise when the 
statutory framework is indeterminate with respect to one or both 
elements. When a statute is silent or ambiguous, the allocation of 
decision-making powers deviates considerably from the constitutional 
architecture outlined above. Arbitrariness review, which provides a 
check against unrestrained agency power and interference, must 
therefore be further qualified to reflect the varying degree of 
determinacy of statutes (and the resulting changes in power 
allocations) with respect to both cost determination and cost 
quantification. 
1. Cost Determination and Statutory Indeterminacy 
When the statutory definition of interests is unclear or indeterminate, 
agencies might play a role in the cost determination process. Agency’s 
policy judgments underlying the interpretation of the indeterminate 
statute influence the specification process of the set of relevant 
interests (i.e., the definition of whose interests should be made a cost 
to whom). When such ambiguity occurs, arbitrariness review asks 
                                                                 
 55. According, to pre-Michigan case law, statutory silence or ambiguity should 
not be interpreted as “mandating” agencies to perform cost consideration. See 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-08 (2015); Id. at 2716-17 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 56. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 57. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (1988). 
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whether an agency’s own choices, with respect to the definition of the 
relevant interests, satisfy the rationality requirements. Indeed, 
statutory silence or ambiguity regarding the definition of relevant 
interests makes it even more necessary for agencies to create 
transparent decision-making procedures and account for the 
deliberation of whose interests are made a cost to whom. Therefore, 
when conducting an arbitrariness review, courts should recognize and 
award credit to political considerations that occur during the agency 
rulemaking process.58 This raises the difficult question of whether 
rationality review should allow political considerations to explain 
administrative decision-making. Watts has convincingly argued that 
courts should distinguish between “rational and logically relevant 
political influences that we can presume Congress intended the agency 
to be able to consider” and “those sorts of corrupting political 
influences that Congress would not intend an agency to consider.”59 
From this perspective, courts should assess whether the political 
considerations influencing an agency’s cost determination are “tied to 
the public values or policies being implemented by the statutory 
scheme” and whether “Congress [can] be presumed to have authorized 
agency reliance on such factors.”60 
2. Cost Quantification and Statutory Indeterminacy 
A statutory framework often provides various indications to 
agencies as to the process of cost quantification. When the content of 
cost quantification is defined by statute, courts are required to ask 
whether an agency’s cost quantification complies with statutory 
provisions.61 However, when a statute is silent or indeterminate on cost 
                                                                 
 58. See EDLEY, supra note 12; Kagan, supra note 12, at 2380-2381; Watts, supra 
note 12. For arguments in opposition, see Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and 
Judicial Review: A Response to Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 573 (2010); 
Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141 (2012). 
 59. Watts, supra note 12, at 52. 
 60. Id. at 54. 
 61. For example, many statutes expressly include cost as one of the factors to be 
taken into consideration by agency alongside a number of other factors. Other 
statutes more explicitly mandate agencies to balance costs against benefits. Still 
others require agencies to regulate “to the extent feasible.” For an overview of the 
2017] MICHIGAN V. EPA: COST/RATIONALITY NEXUS CLARIFIED 147 
 
quantification, significant portions of decision-making power are 
allocated to agencies and/or courts. When this occurs, agencies engage 
in their own cost-benefit balancing based on “default” principles that 
have emerged in federal common law.62 
When a challenge to a regulation reaches a court, judges assess 
whether the agency’s cost quantification satisfies the rationality 
requirements. This raises questions of what, precisely, agencies are 
permitted to do (given Congress’ silence on cost quantification), and 
to what extent judges can review agencies’ quantified evaluation of 
their regulations.63 What must be emphasized is that Congress’ silence 
on cost quantification should not involve an increased allocation of 
decision-making powers to agencies and courts as to cost 
determination. We will argue in the next section that the line of 
reasoning followed by the Supreme Court in Michigan made this 
precise error by conflating the logic of cost quantification with that of 
cost determination in interpreting the relevant statutory provision. 
Based on these considerations we draw a four-cell matrix (Table 3) 
that summarizes the content of rationality review as a function of two 
variables: the degree of statutory determinacy and the cost 
determination/cost quantification stage. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
various forms of statutory treatment of cost quantification, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001); Masur & Posner, 
supra note 6, at Appendix. 
 62. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1655; Masur & Posner, supra note 6, at 39-
40. 
 63. A detailed examination about these issues is outside the scope of this paper. 
For further information, see Sunstein, supra note 6; Pierce, supra note 4; Jonathan 
Cannon, The Sounds of Silence: Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc., 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 425 (2010); Masur & Posner, supra note 
6; Schratz, supra note 6. 
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Table 3. Cost Consideration and Statutory Determinacy 
 Determinate Statute Indeterminate 
Statute 
Cost 
Determination  
Courts should review 
whether the agency’s 
decision actually 
relies on, and is 
consistent with, the 
statutory definition of 
the set of relevant 
interests. 
Courts should review 
whether the agency’s 
own cost 
determination 
satisfies hard look 
review, distinguishing 
between legitimate 
and illegitimate 
political influence. 
Cost 
Quantification  
Courts should review 
the adequacy of the 
agency’s 
consideration of the 
consequences of 
administrative action 
on the set of relevant 
interests.  
Courts should review 
whether the agency’s 
own cost 
quantification is 
consistent with the 
principles of reasoned 
decision-making. 
 
III. MICHIGAN REVISITED THROUGH THE LENS OF INTERESTS 
Our proposed conceptual framework of the cost/rationality nexus 
helps us to analyze the primary question in Michigan: whether the EPA 
acted unreasonably in refusing to consider costs at the listing phase. 
As previously noted, the Court addresses this issue of statutory 
interpretation from the perspective of rational of administrative 
decision-making. The Court establishes a connection between cost and 
rationality; based on this connection, it reads a requirement of cost 
quantification into section 7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA. We contend that 
the Supreme Court’s arguments regarding the cost/rationality nexus 
were inconclusive, leading to a decision that is inconsistent with 
Congress’ cost determination and that produces problematic 
institutional implications. 
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A. The Irrelevance of Cost Quantification at the Listing Phase 
In Michigan, the Supreme Court held that the EPA acted 
unreasonably when, in refusing to consider costs at the listing phase, it 
failed to provide justification that the proposed regulation would 
produce more good than harm.64 However, if one examines the facts 
in Michigan through the lens of the interest- and right-based theory of 
the cost-rationality nexus, the holding appears problematic. The 
fundamental flaw of the Court’s reasoning was to conflate the logic of 
cost determination with that of cost quantification. This analytical 
confusion led the Court to formulate a canon of administrative 
rationality that is inconsistent with statutory cost determination. 
As described above, three steps must be followed to establish a 
connection between cost consideration and the rationality of 
administrative action. A rational administrative action is aimed at 
maximizing one or more dimensions of social welfare (step one). 
Social welfare is defined through a critical evaluation of whose welfare 
counts (step two). Cost quantification reveals what level of regulation 
is welfare-maximizing (step three). The decision whether to regulate 
pertains to steps one and two. It requires defining both the regulatory 
goal (“what good and harm?”) and the set of relevant interests (“whose 
good and harm?”) in light of the relevant statutory scheme. These two 
steps enable the agency to explain what costs should be imposed upon 
whom and for what purposes. However, the Court in Michigan 
assesses the rationality of administrative action against the principle 
that regulation should promote more good than harm. By posing the 
question, “does regulation do more good than harm?” rather than, 
“which costs should be imposed upon whom and for what purposes?” 
the Court loses sight of step two, thereby assessing the rationality of 
administrative action without previously clarifying the content of cost 
determination. 
The decision whether to regulate power plant emissions turns on the 
issue of cost determination, that is, the choice between competing 
interests. Benefits to polluters, workers, and consumers associated 
with the production of coal emissions are reciprocally associated with 
the unrealized benefits to the public resulting from a reduction in 
                                                                 
 64. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). 
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pollutants emissions. The reciprocal nature of the costs of pollution 
implies that costs are the result of a choice as to who will have the right 
to impose his or her own interests as costs to others and who will be 
exposed to the exercise of those rights. If one wants to register and 
valorize the public interest in health and environmental protection, that 
interest must be made a cost to producers, workers, and consumers. 
CAA provisions should be interpreted consistently with this cost 
determination underlying the statutory scheme. Instead of assessing 
the rationality of administrative action in terms of the consistency with 
statutory cost determination, the Court in Michigan imposes the 
requirement of cost quantification onto the agency. 
The set of legally relevant interests at the listing phase (and what 
interests are visited upon by the corresponding costs) is 
unambiguously statutorily defined. Congress, through the language of 
the CAA, has established that the public interest in health and welfare 
should be made a cost to producers, consumers, and workers.65 Based 
on this congressional directive, the EPA must conduct a factual inquiry 
that identifies concrete sources of pollution. Once a source of pollution 
has been identified, it must be added to the list of major sources of 
pollution that fall within the objective scope of application of the 
CAA.66 The EPA’s decision to include power plants on the list of 
sources registers and valorizes the public interest in health and welfare 
as a cost to polluters, consumers, and workers. All the EPA must 
determine is whether the physical sources of pollution warrant 
regulation pursuant to statutory cost determination. If so, it must 
proceed to impose the regulatory burden on power plants with all 
consequent compliance costs. The assessment is a technical one based 
on a political and moral framework established by Congress; there is 
no room for cost quantification at the listing phase. Cost quantification 
pertains to a subsequent conceptual step and later regulatory stage, 
wherein it is decided how much the interests that count should be made 
a cost to competing interests. 
The EPA acted reasonably, as it made its determination based on, 
and consistent with, a clear definition of the set of relevant interests 
provided by the statute. Yet the Court’s ruling invoked the assumption 
                                                                 
 65. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
 66. Id. at § 7412(b)(2). 
2017] MICHIGAN V. EPA: COST/RATIONALITY NEXUS CLARIFIED 151 
 
that regulation should do more good than harm. By relying on this 
assumption, the Court assessed the reasonableness of the EPA’s 
administrative action against a principle that pertains to cost 
quantification. However, as repeatedly noted, the EPA’s sole task at 
the listing phase is to make an empirical assessment based on 
unambiguous statutory cost determination. Therefore, the Court made 
a serious error in holding that the EPA acted unreasonably in failing to 
justify its decision. Because the only cost decision relevant to the 
listing phase is one of cost determination, the reasonableness of the 
EPA’s action cannot be assessed against the principles of rationality 
governing cost quantification. 
The foregoing considerations enable us to recognize the logical 
inconsistency of the majority’s reasoning. First, Justice Scalia argues 
that the phrase “appropriate and necessary” entails a larger scope of 
protection, one that includes compliance costs imposed by the 
regulation of power plants.67 This argument unduly extends the set of 
interests relevant to the listing phase. According to the comprehensive 
framework designed by the CAA, the public interest to health and 
welfare must be made a cost to the interest of polluters.68 The CAA 
embodies Congress’ value judgment that the benefits of achieving 
clean, healthy air are worth the cost to polluters. By interpreting the 
phrase, “appropriate and necessary,” as one that includes the polluters’ 
interests within its scope of protection, Justice Scalia arbitrarily altered 
the cost determination provided by statute. In registering the polluters’ 
interests as interests to be made a cost to the public’s interest to health, 
Michigan defeats the purpose of the CAA. 
Second, Michigan imposed the requirement of cost quantification on 
a statutorily pre-determined choice among competing interests. The 
trouble with this is that, as we have seen, cost determination precedes 
quantification; it is therefore illogical to impose cost quantification as 
a requirement for cost determination. 
Finally, by reading an obligation of cost quantification into the 
statutory definition of the listing phase, the Supreme Court introduced 
an additional procedural requirement not mentioned in the APA. One 
might claim this latter objection is irrelevant because Michigan states 
                                                                 
 67. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2709. 
 68. See, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
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that an agency that ignores costs acts arbitrarily, and acting arbitrarily 
is unlawful under the APA.69 However, the problem with this counter 
objection is that the Supreme Court did not convincingly identify a 
canon of rationality under which ignoring costs at the listing phase 
should be deemed an arbitrary action. Instead, the Court simply 
assessed the EPA’s refusal to consider costs against a rationality 
standard (i.e., the EPA should provide reasons that the proposed 
regulation would do more harm than good) that pertains to the cost 
quantification stage and does not fit the listing phase. In short, the 
Supreme Court, not the EPA, foisted cost inconsistency on agencies, 
by rendering a decision that subverts the statutorily prescribed value 
choices as to whose interests should be made a cost to whom made at 
the statutory level. 
B. Does the Michigan Default Rule Produce More Harm Than 
Good? 
If courts read Michigan as establishing that reasonable regulation 
requires cost quantification at each regulatory stage, then Michigan 
will have costly repercussions. By imposing cost quantification at the 
listing phase, Michigan may undermine the effect of many regulatory 
schemes, thereby defeating congressional intent. This is not an 
incidental effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling, but the inevitable 
result of a rule that anticipates the cost quantification phase. 
Additionally, conditioning the listing decision on cost quantification 
might significantly increase the transaction costs associated with the 
regulatory process. Because costs depend on regulatory options that 
the EPA can only choose after an initial listing decision, cost 
quantification may be unfeasible at the listing phase. Until the EPA 
knows which standards it will set, it cannot know what costs such 
standards will impose. Cost calculations are highly variable and 
depend on several factors, including the targets being set, the 
                                                                 
 69. For example, Sunstein, supra note 6, at 16, argues that: “Michigan v. EPA 
has the great virtue of identifying the fatal weakness in [the] tempting objection . . . 
that courts lack the authority to impose procedural requirements . . . . As Michigan 
v. EPA suggests, the problem with the objection is that under the APA. . . . [i]f an 
agency ignores costs, or imposes a risk that is greater than the risk that it is reducing, 
it would seem to be acting arbitrarily.” 
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technologies and methods that will be utilized, and the stringency of 
the standards. Moreover, premature cost considerations could be 
misleading, because “the more stringent option is not necessarily the 
more costly.”70 Finally, technological developments, which contribute 
to the decline of compliance costs, cause cost estimations to become 
quickly outdated. It should be noted that no reasonable methodologies 
on how to include cost calculations at the listing phase have been 
presented by the Court. 
The new default rule also raises concerns as to its institutional 
implications, which may prove critical to future environmental and 
public health regulations. Michigan applies a presumption in favor of 
cost consideration by the Court, based on the argument that in the 
regulatory context a reasonable understanding of the relevant statutory 
factor is almost always conducive to the conclusion that cost is a 
relevant factor.71 The broad language used by the Court suggests that 
cost consideration must be regarded as a requirement of any reasonable 
regulation, unless Congress clearly speaks in favor of cost-blindness.72 
That is, an agency’s duty to consider costs is rooted in judicial 
understanding of the APA’s ban on arbitrariness and is largely 
independent of the statutory scheme. As Justice Scalia states, 
“consideration of cost reflects the understanding that reasonable 
regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the 
advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions” and the 
                                                                 
 70. Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of 
Law, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 36, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699 (2015), (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-19). 
 71. Justice Scalia states, “Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that 
reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages and the 
disadvantages of agency decisions.” Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (emphasis added). 
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion agrees with the majority on this point and 
emphasizes: “Cost is almost always a relevant—and usually, a highly important— 
factor in regulation.” Id. at 2716 (Kagan, J. dissenting). 
 72. “This language is not tied to the particular facts or statutory scheme in 
Michigan. Instead, it seems to create a presumption that ‘reasonable regulation’ in 
general necessitates some attention to cost . . . the majority’s aforementioned broad 
language suggests the . . . possibility that cost may now be a ‘relevant factor’ or 
‘important aspect of the problem’ whenever an agency decides whether or how to 
regulate.” Note, Clear Air Act—Cost-Benefit Analysis—Michigan v. EPA, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 311, 317-18 (2015). 
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“[s]tatutory context reinforces the relevance of cost.”73 Therefore, in 
the Court’s view, the relevance of cost supersedes the specific statutory 
scheme at issue. However, in failing to clearly distinguish between the 
two separate steps of cost determination and cost quantification, the 
Michigan decision unduly extends the power of courts to interfere with 
both an agency’s decision-making and the statutory definition of legal 
rights. 
This rule increases the costs for Congress of legislative inertia by 
imposing on the legislative branch the burden to expressly preclude 
cost quantification when it intends to exclude cost-benefit balancing at 
a given regulatory stage. While this may not be a concern in cases 
where cost quantification produces effective regulation, it is an issue 
when cost quantification is required of agencies surreptitiously, as an 
antiregulatory device. Furthermore, as we have seen, the more 
indeterminate the statutory definition of rights, the more penetrating 
the Court’s rationality assessment. In brief, by increasing the 
intrusiveness of the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial 
review, Michigan may significantly hinder the effectiveness of 
regulatory action. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan 
acknowledges this point when stating that the majority’s reasoning 
resulted in “a decision that deprives the American public of the 
pollution control measures that the responsible Agency, acting well 
within its delegated authority, found would save many, many lives.” 74 
CONCLUSION 
In time, Michigan may create more harm than good. By conflating 
the logic of cost determination with that of cost quantification when 
assessing the EPA’s administrative action, and by imposing the latter 
at the listing phase, the Supreme Court failed to safeguard the interests 
Congress intended to protect. The Court defeated the purpose of the 
statute when it registered polluters’ interests as interests to be made a 
cost to the public’s interest to health, despite Congress’ unambiguous 
determination to the contrary. By establishing the general principle 
that cost consideration is a requirement of administrative rationality, 
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 74. Id. at 2726 (Kagan, J. dissenting). 
2017] MICHIGAN V. EPA: COST/RATIONALITY NEXUS CLARIFIED 155 
 
without properly clarifying the meaning of the cost/rationality nexus, 
Michigan invites agencies and the judiciary to second-guess statutory 
cost determinations. This might have been avoided had the Court 
considered the distinction between cost determination and cost 
quantification. A coherent conception of this distinction would have 
enabled the Court to clearly articulate the prescriptive meaning of the 
cost/rationality nexus and that administrative action remained 
consistent with the congressional definition of legitimate interests. 
Ultimately, Michigan highlights the importance of properly 
appreciating the juridical assumptions underpinning cost 
consideration, and the relevance of these assumptions in the context of 
rationality review of administrative action. 
